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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the evidence introduced at trial present an 
issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiff's failure to 
return the executed installment contract and down payment 
within a reasonable time constituted a breach of the settle-
ment agreement entered into by Plaintiff and Defendant 
precluding the Court from ruling as a matter of law that 
Defendant breached the settlement agreement by entering a 
default judgment? 
2. Was jury instruction No. 3 as to damages for 
Defendant's wrongful entry of a default judgment based upon 
a conclusion not dictated by the evidence and therefore 
prejudicial to Defendant? 
3. Is it necessary for Plaintiff to show malice in 
fact in order to recover punitive damages for a claim of 
abuse of process? 
4. Is the award of compensatory damages in the amount 
of $250.00 and the award of punitive damages in the amount 
of $37,000.00 so grossly disproportionate that it cannot be 
sustained as a matter of law? 
5. Did the District Court err when it denied Defen-
dant's Motion for Remitittur of the award which Defendant 
argued was unsupported by facts in evidence sufficient to 
establish Defendant's malice and unsupported by the 
controlling law as to the appropriateness of the punitive 
damages? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October, 1983, Plaintiff purchased from Defendant a 
video game to be placed in Plaintiff's arcade in Box Elder 
County. (Tr. 6) In early November, 1983, Plaintiff in-
formed Mr. Merlin Symes, Defendant's manager, that the game _ 
was not performing to his expectations and asked permission-^ 
to return it to Defendant. Defendant's manager refused to 
accept return of the game. (Tr. 8-9, 74) Plaintiff there-
after refused to make further payments and Defendant filed 
suit against Plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit Court, Murray 
Department, in February, 1984, to recover from Plaintiff the 
purchase price of the video game. (Tr. 10, 87-88) Upon 
Plaintiff's receipt of the summons and complaint, Plaintiff 
contacted Defendant's manager by telephone for the purpose ^ 
of negotiating a settlement of the dispute. (Tr. 10, 7 7>--gc 
79) The parties orally agreed that Plaintiff would execute 
an installment purchase contract for the purchase of the 
video game and make a down payment of $500.00 and Defendant 
would dismiss the pending law suit and accept payment under 
the installment purchase contract in settlement of its 
claims. (Tr. 11, 79-80) Defendant's manager agreed that 
Plaintiff would not be required to respond to the complaint 
filed in the Murray Department of the Fifth Circuit Court 
-2-
and Defendant would dismiss the action upon Defendant's 
receipt of the executed contract and the initial payment 
thereunder. (Tr. 11, 79) The contract was prepared by the 
Defendant and sent to Plaintiff for execution within four or 
five days of the telephone conversation. (Tr. 11, 80) 
On or about March 4, 1984, Defendant's counsel, C. 
Kingston, contacted Defendant and asked if Plaintiff had 
settled the account or if a Default Judgment should be 
entered as no response had been made to the Complaint. (Tr. 
95) C. Kingston was advised that the contract for install-
ment purchase of the video game had been sent to Plaintiff 
for his execution but that Plaintiff had not returned it and 
had made no payments, and that C. Kingston should proceed to 
take judgment. (Tr. 96) Defendant's counsel proceeded to 
prepare a Default Judgment and forward it to the Murray 
Circuit Court on March 14, 1984, where it was entered on 
March 20, 1984. (Tr. 29, 88) A copy of the judgment was 
docketed in Box Elder County on April 16, 1984. (Tr. 29, 
88) 
A Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings was 
issued and served upon the Plaintiff on or about the 1st day 
of May, 1984. (Tr. 13-14, 88; Exhibit No. 2) 
In the interim between counsel for Defendant's inquiry 
as to the status of the payments and the entry of the 
default judgment, Defendant received a check and the 
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executed contract from Plaintiff. (Tr. 12-13; Exhibit No. 
1) The check and contract were dated February 27, 1984, but 
were received by Defendant on March 15, 1984. (Tr. 80-81) 
Plaintiff telephoned C. Kingston upon service of the 
Order in Supplemental Proceedings, on or about May 4, 1984, 
and told him that he had made arrangements with the Defen-
dant for payment of the amount due. (Tr. 15, 89) C. _ 
Kingston contacted Defendant and was told that Plaintiff was:t: 
making monthly payments and that further collection action *-
should be suspended until C. Kingston was notified. C. 
Kingston was not told that Plaintiff had signed a contract. 
(Tr. 83, 89, 91, 94, 95) C. Kingston then informed Plain-
tiff that he need not appear in Court on the Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings. (Tr. 15) 
In January, 1985, Plaintiff undertook to refinance a 
business debt secured by a mortgage on a residence and&Hr 
learned from representatives of First Security Bank thatafe 
Defendant's judgment constituted a lien on his property. 
(Tr. 16, 90) Plaintiff contacted the Defendant's counsel 
(C. Kingston) in January, 1985, (Tr. 90) and requested that 
the judgment be released, asserting that all payments on the 
account had been made. (Tr. 16) On or about January 10, 
1985, Kingston contacted Defendant and was informed that 
Plaintiff's payments were not current (Tr. 83, 91), and 
Defendant requested that collection action be pursued. C. 
-4-
Kingston informed Plaintiff by letter that the judgment 
would not be set aside. (Tr. 92) Plaintiff was also 
advised that he was delinquent in payments upon an open 
account in favor of Defendant. (Tr. 17, 92; Exhibit No. 3) 
Accordingly, a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings 
was issued on February 27, 1985. (Tr. 18-19; Exhibit No. 4) 
Despite the existence of the lien against Plaintiff's 
residential property, First Security Bank accepted the 
property as security and increased the principal amount of 
Plaintiff's loan with no increase in the rate of interest. 
(Tr. 44) 
Thereafter, Plaintiff retained an attorney to contact 
Defendant. (Tr. 19) Plaintiff's attorney requested that 
the judgment be set aside based upon the prior settlement 
which had been negotiated between the parties. (Tr. 91; 
Exhibit No. 5) Plaintiff's counsel further asserted that 
Plaintiff had performed according to the terms of the 
purchase contract which had been negotiated as part of that 
settlement. (Exhibit No. 5) 
C. Kingston inquired of Defendant and learned of the 
contract signed by Plaintiff. He responded by letter to 
Plaintiff's attorney dated March, 1985, (Tr. 91; Exhibit No. 
6) that the contract may have been a satisfaction of the 
account sued upon originally, and that he would have the 
Order in Supplemental Proceedings stricken. (Tr. 92,99) 
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On March 27, 1985, C. Kingston further responded to 
Plaintiff's demand that judgment be released by preparing a 
Satisfaction of Judgment and by personally obtaining the 
Court's signature on an Order for Vacation of the Judgment 
in the original case filed in the Fifth Circuit Court, and 
forwarding the same for entry. (Transcript 29, 100; Exhibit 
No. 12) C. Kingston also informed Plaintiff's counsel thati^ 
the default judgment had been prepared based on his informate 
mation that Defendant had received neither the executed J 
contract nor the payment which Plaintiff agreed to make. 
(Tr. 96-97; Exhibit No. 7) Kingston denied that any malice 
or wrongful intent to injure the Plaintiff had been involved 
in his entry of the Default Judgment, but that such had been 
done due to the fact that Plaintiff had failed to comply 
with the terms of the settlement as negotiated. (Tr. 85, 
102) '..-ite. 
Plaintiff filed an action in the District Court of Boxife 
Elder County claiming abuse of process and malicious breach 
of contract, and prayed for actual and punitive damages. 
During the course of the trial, Plaintiff stipulated that as 
of July 10, 1986, he was indebted to Defendant in the sum of 
$1,493.98 on the agreement for sale of the video equipment 
and $775.00 on an open account. (Tr. 25) 
The District Court ruled as a matter of law that 
Defendant breached the settlement agreement. (R. 165, 102) 
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The jury then found that Plaintiff suffered actual damages 
in the amount of $250.00, the sum claimed as attorneyfs fees 
paid by the Plaintiff to his lawyer to have the judgment 
previously entered in the Fifth Circuit Court and docketed 
in Box Elder County set aside. (R. 165, 125-126; Tr. 34, 
45) The jury also found that Defendant's conduct was 
malicious and awarded $37,000.00 as punitive damages against 
Defendant. (R. 165, 125-126) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence before the Trial Court presented an issue 
of fact as to whether the Plaintiff's failure to return the 
executed installment contract and down payment within a 
reasonable time constituted a breach of the settlement 
agreement by Plaintiff that precluded a ruling as a matter 
of law that it was Defendant who breached the settlement 
agreement by obtaining a default judgment against Plaintiff. 
Where the Trial Court invades the jury's province by direct-
ing a verdict on such an issue and there is a substantial 
dispute in the evidence, this Court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
verdict is directed and may refuse to sustain the verdict 
where there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict in 
favor of the losing party. Defendant believes there is 
sufficient evidence to support a verdict that it was 
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Plaintiff who breached the settlement agreement and that the 
directed verdict in Plaintiff's favor was reversible error. 
The Trial Court's explanation of Defendant's breach was 
contained in Jury Instruction No. 3 and submitted to the 
jury only the questions of malice and damages. Where 
Defendant's counsel objected to that Instruction as not 
dictated by the evidence and prejudicial to Defendant, this4^ 
Court may review the appropriateness of the instruction.^ 
Defendant believes that the giving of Instruction No. 3 was 
reversible error because Defendant might have obtained a 
more favorable result absent the error. 
The Trial Court also failed to require a finding of 
malice in fact as a threshold for Plaintiff's recovery of 
punitive damages for abuse of process. Defendant urges this 
Court to find that punitive damages for abuse of process are 
available only in more restricted circumstances, as hasv.m 
previously been held for claims of false imprisonment and;^ 
wrongful attachment. The record contains no evidence of 
malice in fact by the Defendant to support an award of 
punitive damages. 
Should this Court decide that punitive damages were 
awarded on the appropriate legal standard and that the 
record contains sufficient evidence of malice in fact, the 
award of punitive damages 148 times the amount of compen-
satory damages is grossly disproportionate, inconsistent 
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v/ith recent decisions and cannot be sustained as a matter of 
law. 
The Trial Court denied Defendant's Motion for 
Remitittur or in the Alternative New Trial, even though the 
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was far in excess 
of those which this Court had previously refused to sustain. 
Furthermore, the amount set by the jury is without factual 
basis and because so disproportionate must be the product of 
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Defendant 
believes that the denial of Remitittur was erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY 
THE ISSUE OF WHICH PARTY BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THAT 
ISSUE AND WAS ERRONEOUS. 
Evidence presented at the trial of this matter estab-
lished that the installment contract (Exhibit No. 1) was an 
enforceable contract, drafted by the Defendant and signed by 
the Plaintiff. Performance according to the terms of the 
contract would constitute a settlement of the pending 
lawsuit which had been brought by the Defendant in the Fifth 
Circuit Court to obtain amounts due from Plaintiff for the 
purchase of video equipment. (Tr. 11-15, 80, 95) 
-9-
Testimony of the Plaintiff and of Defendant's attorney, 
C. Kingston, addressed the issue of whether Plaintiff timely 
performed by executing the contract and mailing the down 
payment of Five Hundred Dollars ($500) as agreed. Plain-
tiff's testimony, however, was ambiguous as to the dates 
when the contract was received by Plaintiff and returned to 
Defendant. (Tr. 11-12) Plaintiff could only testify that -. 
the contract was dated February 27, 1984. (Tr. 12) « 
Defendant's division manager testified that he had come ~ 
to an agreement with Plaintiff (Tr. 79) , that the contract 
was sent out for signature in the last part of February of 
1984, (Tr. 79-80) and that a copy of the signed contract was 
back in the possession of the Defendant on March 15, 1984. 
(Tr. 81) Defendant's attorney, C. Kingston, prepared a 
Default Judgment and sent it to the Fifth Circuit Court for 
entry on the 14th day of March, 1984, (Tr. 88) and he rat 
learned of the existence of the contract executed in settle-
ment of the Defendant's claims in March, 1985. (Tr. 91) 
When C. Kingston learned of this settlement agreement he 
promptly acted upon that knowledge by preparing a Satis-
faction of Judgment and by obtaining the signature of the 
Court on an Order to Vacate the judgment obtained in the 
Fifth Circuit Court (Tr. 100) on the ground that the cont-
ract constituted an accord and satisfaction of Defendant's 
original claim against Plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff VanDyke's claim is that Defendant breached 
the settlement agreement by obtaining a Default Judgment in 
the Fifth Circuit Court. Defendant claims that (1) despite 
the date on the contract itself, it was Plaintiff who 
breached by failing to timely comply with the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement; (2) that Defendant did not have the 
signed contract and down payment in its possession until 
March 15, 1984; (3) that its counsel, C. Kingston, made 
inquiries of Defendant and was informed that Defendant had 
not received the executed contract and down payment from 
Plaintiff as required by the settlement agreement and that 
the Default Judgment was submitted to the Murray Circuit 
Court on March 14, 1984, in the ordinary course when 
Plaintiff failed to answer the complaint filed against him 
or to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. 
Defendant contends that the testimony cited above 
presented an issue of fact as to whether or not the settle-
ment agreement was breached and by which party, which issue 
was a proper one for the jury. Instead, the Court ruled 
that the Defendant had breached the agreement as a matter of 
law and submitted to the jury only the question of damages. 
The District Court's explanation of Interrogatory No. 
I, Instruction No. 3, contains the following language: 
[T]he Court also finds that the Contract and 
Five Hundred Dollar ($500) payment was made before 
the Default Judgment and/or filed the judgment in 
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Box Elder County. [sic] This was a breach of 
contract regardless of whether it was done intention-
ally or in oversight. The Plaintiff is entitled 
to his damages reasonably incurred in removing 
that judgment . . . . 
(R. 103) Defendant believes the Court's failure to submit 
the question to the jury constituted a directed verdict and 
was erroneous under the circumstances. 
Recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have defined 
4.. 
the principles of law relevant to a directed verdict. Where 
a motion for directed verdict is made, all evidence must be 
considered by the trial court in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom it is directed. Cerritos Trucking 
Co. v. Utah Venture No. lf 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1982) . Where 
there is any substantial dispute in the evidence, a case 
should not be taken from the jury. Cerritos Trucking, 645 
P. 2d at 611. Furthermore: 
This Court's standard of review of a directed 
verdict is the same as that imposed upon the trial ,: 
Court. We must examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, and if there 
is a reasonable basis in the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing party, 
the directed verdict can not be sustained. 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homowners Assoc, v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
The portions of the testimony cited above are in-
dicative of the conflictive evidence surrounding the events 
of February and March, 1984, and the necessity for a 
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determination by the fact finding body of whether it was 
Plaintiff, Defendant or both parties whose conduct 
constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. This 
issue is the threshold for all of Plaintiff's claims. 
Defendant respectfully urges the Court to examine the 
evidence and reverse the directed verdict on this issue. 
POINT II 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 WHICH SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
ONLY THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES WAS ERRONEOUS AND 
PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Defendant is aware that the accepted rules of appellate 
review preclude the Supreme Court from substituting its 
judgment for that of a jury on issues of fact, unless the 
evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant 
that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of 
the case. E.A. Strout Western Realty v. VhC. Foy & Sons, 
Inc. , 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). Defendant is also aware 
that a party must preserve exceptions to particular jury 
instructions by timely objections. E.A. Strout Western 
Realty, 665 P.2d at 1322. 
It is Defendant's position that Interrogatories Nos. I 
and III of Jury Instruction No. 3 were given after the Court 
had directed a verdict on the issue of Defendant's breach of 
the settlement agreement. Jurors were not given the oppor-
tunity to determine whether Defendant's conduct was actually 
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in violation of the terms of the agreement, but only the 
presence of malice and the amount of damages to be awarded 
to the Plaintiff. (R. 102-103; 105-106) Defendant's 
counsel objected to the explanation to Instruction No. 3 
(Tr. 128) which contained the District Courtfs directed 
verdict and consequent intrusion upon the jury's province. 
Defendant asserts that the District Courtfs instruction 
was erroneous and prejudicial because it presumed a breach 
by Defendant and dictated an award of damages. That verdict**^ 
was based on conflicting evidence and, hence, was erroneous; 
the instruction as to damages was, hence, prejudicial. 
Defendant urges the Court to find this combination of 
directed verdict and instruction reversible error. 
This Court has previously found an instruction to be 
erroneous in a case in which the jury had been instructed 
that the driver of a vehicle was negligent as a matter of „ 
law and that the jury could conclude that his negligence w a s ^ 
the sole proximate cause of a collision. "In the present 
case, the disputed instruction was erroneous because it 
failed to submit the proximate cause issue to the jury for 
determination.11 Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P. 2d 
217, 220 (Utah 1983). The Court continued: 
We do not mean to imply that rulings by the 
Trial Court which decide a factual contention as a 
matter of law are never appropriate. But the 
right to trial by jury is a basic principal of our 
system that can not be allowed to be eroded by 
-14-
improper intrusions on the jury's prerogative. . . . 
Id. 
The Court's second inquiry in Harris was whether the 
errors were sufficiently prejudicial to constitute grounds 
for reversal. "An error is reversible if there is a reason-
able likelihood that a more favorable result would have been 
obtained by the complaining party in the absence of the 
error." Harris, 671 P.2d at 222. 
The present case presents a combination of errors 
similar to those of Harris. Defendant believe that, absent 
the errors, the jury might have released it from any liabil-
ity at all for this incident. According to the standards 
set forth in Harris, such errors are grounds for reversal. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
WHEN IT DID NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF MALICE IN 
FACT AS A BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. 
This Court need not accord its typical difference to 
the judgment of the trial court where principles of law have 
been misapplied. Jeppson vs. Jeppson, 684 P. 2d 69 (Utah 
1984) . Defendant contends that punitive damages for abuse 
of process require a showing of actual malice and that the 
District Court did not sufficiently articulate the standard 
for a determination of damages. 
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Two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions have addressed 
the appropriateness of punitive damages where process has 
been wrongfully used. First, in an action for damages due 
to wrongful attachment, the Court held that punitive damages 
might be awarded where the violation of rights was found to 
be willful and malicious. First Security Bank of Utah v. J. 
B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, the finding of actual malice 
upon which the lower court based its punitive 
damages award was not derived from direct evidence 
concerning the state of mind of Plaintiff's 
officers, but rather was inferred from Plaintiff's 
wrongful actions. Such evidence, while sufficient 
to sustain the finding of the trial court, does 
not show a vindictivness or ill will so extreme as 
to warrant the vast sum awarded here, which is 
many times greater than the punitive damages 
awards in any of the cases cited by intervenor. 
First Security Bank 653 P.2d at 599. 
Second, in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., the 
"%iy 
court declared that the appropriate standard for determining^ 
W 
the availability of punitive damages in an action for false <~ 
imprisonment is that of "malice in fact" and not malice 
implied by law. 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant urges the Court to make clear that abuse of 
process, like false imprisonment and wrongful attachment, is 
an action in which a claim is made that correct procedures 
have been misused for ulterior and wrongful purposes, and 
that actual malice must be shown to support an award of 
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punitive damages. Such a requirement was imposed by the 
Supreme Court of Northa Dakota: 
[A]n abuse of process can occur only when the 
facts [sic] constituting the abuse are done 
willfully. If the acts are done maliciously, 
exemplary damages can also be sought, but willful-
ness is the basic requirement. A person is liable 
for an abuse of process if he knowingly partici-
pates in the abuse of process. Good faith, 
however, is a defense. 
A & A Metal Bldgs. v. I-S, Inc., 274 N.W. 2d 183, 187 (North 
Dakota 1978). 
A review of the record makes clear that there was no 
showing of actual malice. For example, C. Kingston testi-
fied that neither he nor the Defendant had any purpose in 
obtaining the Default Judgment other than to reduce to 
judgment the amount owed to Defendant by Plaintiff for the 
purchase of video equipment. (Tr. 101-102). Mr. Symes gave 
substantially the same testimony. (Tr. 85) . In fact, when 
it became apparent to C. Kingston that an agreement in 
settlement of the Fifth Circuit Court action had been 
negotiated between Plaintiff and Defendant, his immediate 
response was to prepare documents to have that judgment set 
aside. (Tr. 106). Such actions in good faith negate 
allegations of malice. 
In Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, this Court concluded: 
[T]he essence of that cause of action [for 
abuse of process] is a perversion of the process 
to accomplish some improper purpose, such as 
compelling its victim to do something which he 
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would not otherwise be legally obliged to do. On 
the other hand if it is used for its proper and 
intended purpose, the mere fact that it has some 
other collateral effect does not constitute abuse 
of process. As specifically applicable here, this 
is so even though it may incidentally and in-
directly exert pressure for the collection of a 
debt. 
519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1974). Accordingly, a creditor may 
legitimately pursue its remedies for unpaid obligations. 
The incidental pressure for collection of a debt does not^-, 
even constitute an abuse of process; certainly it does not 
rise to the level of malicious conduct. 
Defendant's conduct toward Plaintiff was only that of a 
creditor seeking to collect amounts admittedly due. Surely 
there is not sufficient evidence of actual hatred, ill will 
or vindictiveness in the record to reach the threshold for 
an award of punitive damages. Defendant alleges that by 
failing to require the appropriate showing of malice for 
punitive damages for abuse of process, the District Court
 ;& 
misapplied principles of law and its decision may be re-^ 
versed. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND SO GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO 
THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTUAL DAMAGES THAT, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, IT CAN NOT BE SUSTAINED. 
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On several recent occasions this Court has considered 
the propriety of punitive damage awards and has set forth 
the following factors for the fact finder's consideration: 
1. The nature of the alleged misconduct of the Defen-
dant; 
2. The extent of the effect of the misconduct on the 
lives of the Plaintiff and others; 
3. The probability of future recurrences of such 
misconduct; 
4. The relationship between the parties; 
5. The relative wealth of the Defendant; 
6. The facts and circumstances surrounding the miscon-
duct; 
7. The amount of actual damages awarded. 
First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 
598 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant contends that the facts presented at trial, 
when viewed in relation to the factors set forth above, do 
not justify an award of punitive damages. Although it is 
claimed that Defendant failed to release a lien on Plain-
tiff's investment property, the jury was convinced that the 
effect of that alleged misconduct was limited to actual 
damages in the amount of $250.00 for attorney's fees. There 
is very little probability that such conduct will recur due 
to that fact that (1) these circumstances involved a 
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Plaintiff who was admittedly indebted to Defendant, and (2) 
the events are attributable, at least in part, to the 
conduct of the Plaintiff himself. The final factor in-
dicates that this Court will consider whether the amount of 
actual damages incurred justifies an award of punitive 
damages. Defendant believes that actual damages of $250.00 
do not dictate an award of punitive damages in any amount. ~ 
Should it be determined, however, that punitive damages^ 
are warranted, Bundy v. Century Equipment Co. requires that 
"[a] punitive damages award must bear some reasonable 
relation to the actual damages." 692 P. 2d 754, 760 (Utah 
1984) . With regard to the relation of actual to punitive 
damages, this Court found Bundy1s award of Two Thousand One 
Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars ($2,133) compensatory and 
Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) punitive damages 
(1:12) grossly disproportionate. In Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P. 2d 1106 (Utah 1985), an award o f « 
Four Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Dollars ($452,000) compensa-
tory and Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000) punitive 
damages was "not excessive"; but in Cruz v. Montoya, 660 
P. 2d 723 (Utah 1983), where compensatory damages of Nine 
Thousand Five Hundred Seventy-Nine Dollars and Eighty-nine 
Cents ($9,579.89) were awarded, punitives of Twelve Thousand 
Dollars ($12,000) were reduced by this Court to Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000). 
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As a general rule, a reviewing Court will defer to a 
jury determination unless the verdict is so excessive as to 
shock the conscience and clearly indicate passion, prejudice 
or corruption on the part of the jury, Cruz v. Montoya, 660 
P.2d at 726. Moreover, this Court has stated: 
[W]hen [an exemplary damages award] is so flagrantly 
excessive and unjust as to indicate a disregard of 
the rules of law by which damages are regulated, 
it is then subject to review and correction as a 
matter of law. 
First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 
599 (Utah 1982) (quoting Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 
629 P. 1008 (Utah 1928)). 
The jury awarded the Plaintiff in this matter the sum 
of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250), which amount the jury 
believed to be the total of Plaintiff's actual damages from 
Defendant's conduct. (R. 165) Punitive damages were 
awarded in the amount of Thirty Seven Thousand Dollars 
($37,000), one hundred forty eight (148) times the amount of 
the compensatory damages (R. 165). Such disproportion is 
not based on the evidence and can only be attributed to 
passion and prejudice. Defendant urges the court to direct 
the trial court to reduce the excessive damage award. 
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POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF REMITTITUR. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Remittitur attacked the jury's award of punitive damages as 
unsupported by the evidence and grossly disproportionate. 
In light of the precedents cited above and in Defendant's 
Memorandum, the award herein of punitive damages One Hundred ,,. 
Forty Eight (14 8) times the amount of the compensatory r 
damages is grossly disproportionate. Bundy v. Century r> 
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). Furthermore, there 
is insufficient evidence in the record of vindictiveness or 
ill will to warrant such a large award. First Security 
Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Consequently, the Court's denial of Remitittur was 
erroneous. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the precedents cited above and the 
record submitted herein, Defendant respectfully urges this 
Court to declare that punitive damages for abuse of process 
require a showing of actual malice, and to direct the 
District Court to reduce the excessive award of punitive 
damages or, in the alternative, to remand for a finding of 
fact on the issues of breach of the settlement agreement and 
the presence of malice in the conduct of Defendant, 
Respectfully submitted, 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
Dennis K. Poole 
Marily^ jn P. Fineshriber 
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ADDENDUM 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
In this case the Jury will not render a General Verdict as is 
sometimes done. It is your function to answer certain interrogatories, 
that is questions. When you answer the questions the parties will then 
make the needed calculations and enter a legal judgment. 
The burden of proof by a preponderence of evidence is on the 
side contending the answer should be "YES". If the evidence does 
not preponder in the "YES" favor or is evenly balanced, or favor 
a "NO" answer the answer should be "NO". "*~ 
If the question requires the fixing of a damaged figure, the
 ]:m 
plaintiff must prove such damages by a preponderence of the events,^ 
that he is entitled to the sum awarded or no sum may be awarded. 
INTERROGATORIES I 
1. WHAT SUM DO YOU FIND PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS 
• COMPENSATION DAMAGES FOR THE DEFENDANT'S WRONGFUL 
ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY AND/OR 
IN FILING OF A JUDGMENT IN BOX ELDER COUNTY THAT LIENNED 
• THE PLAINTIFF'S REAL PROPERTY?
 m «--
AWARDED _. 
Explanation: The law anticipates that the Judge will 
simplify the issues so far as practical. If the parties agree 
on the issue, the court generally has accepted the agreement. If 
the evidence is not in conflict, so that the reasonable minds of 
jurors could not disagree, the court will not submit the issue 
but will assume the jury has already ruled in conformance with the 
evidence. 
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In this case the Judge has ruled that the parties signed a 
legally enforceable contract "Exhibit No. 1". The defendant 
agreed he would abandon his claim for the original purchase price 
in the law suit that he had filed in the Circuit Court in Murray, 
Utah. The plaintiff agreed that he would make a $500.00 down payment 
and then time payments. Neither side has abandoned that contract. 
The court finds that the parties agree the plaintiff still owes 
certain sums on that contract. The court will enter a judgment on 
that portion of the claim in the defendant's favor together with 
the sum still owed on the open account. The court also finds that 
the contract and $500.00 payment was made before the default judgment 
and/or filed the judgment in Box Elder County. This was a breach 
of contract regardless of whether it was done intentionally or in 
oversight. The plaintiff is entitled to his damages reasonably 
incurred in removing that judgment. The plaintiff contends he paid 
certain sums in attorney's fees. Defendant contends this was not 
necessary because they would and did remove it when called to their 
attention. The court submits that issue to the jury for determination. 
There has been some evidence received concerning whether or not 
the plaintiff paid additional interest, etc., or had other out of 
pocket expenses. The court rules the interest return would not change 
(prime plus 3) and the bank never restricted payments on the principal; 
therefore the court rules there is no substantial evidence of any 
expense other then possible attorney's fees. 
This question concerns only compensation damages and does not 
concern possible punitive damages. Punitive damages are addressed 
in other interrogatories. 
, INTERROGATORY NO. II 
1. DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S BREACH OF CONTRACT IN THE TAKING OF 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND/OR FILING THE JUDGMENT IN BOX 
ELDER COUNTY WAS AN INTENTIONAL BREACH OF CONTRACT DONE 
-25-
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WITH MALICE OR TO GAIN AN UNLAWFUL ADVANTAGE OVER THE 
PLAINTIFF? 
"YES" 
"NO" 
Explanation: The general rule is that only compensation damages 
dan be awarded for a breach of contract, there is an exception in 
law to this rule. An exception exists when a person knowingly and 
intentionally breaches the contract with malice. Malice is present"" 
if the motive for the breach of contract is spite, hatred, an intent 
to inflict emotional stress or suffering, or when it is done to 
gain an illegal advantage. Only if a breach of contract is accompanied 
by malice may a punitive judgment be awarded. No punitive damage 
can be awarded against a person for breach of contract who acts in 
good faith even though his actions might be negligent or careless 
so as to subject him to compendation damages. 
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant employee and/or lawyer 
knew they had no right to pursue the default judgment or to file the 
judgment in Box Elder County when they did it or delay removing it. 
The plaintiff alleges that the motive for such action was malice, 410" 
spite, hatred and intent to inflict pain or to take an illegal '^' 
advantage over the plaintiff by unlawfully liening his home and 
real property so as to force payment on the new contract and/or the 
open account. The defendant denies this allegation and alleges the 
action was a result of an honest mistake that does not exponse them 
to punitive damages. 
The burden of prooof is on the plaintiff to prove an intentional, 
malicious, wrong. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. Ill 
1. DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEES AND/OR LAWYER INTENTIONALLY 
USED ILLEGALLY "ABUSED THE PROCESS" BY UNLAWFULLY FILING 
OR ALLOWING AN INVALID JUDGMENT TO BE CONTINUED IN BOX 
ELDER COUNTY TO GAIN AN ILLEGAL CREDITORS ADVANTAGE OF 
A DEBTOR? 
"YES" 
"NO" 
Explanation: The tort of "abuse of process" is present when 
a person pretends to be using legal use of process for a purpose 
but intentionally use it for a different purpose or to inflict 
unnecessary stress or pain. An example may be when a creditor 
refuses to remove a mortgage or . lien in an attempt to force a 
payment on a different debt. The plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant's employees and/or lawyer has done that in this case. 
The defendant denied this and asserts they made an honest mistake. 
The issue is submitted to the jury. 
The distinguishing between a "malicious breach of contract" 
and "abuse of process" generally is that the "abuse of process" 
that involves the use of court process where an intentional 
breach of contract may or may not involve an abuse of process. 
If the plaintiff proves an abuse of process the law permits the 
award of punitive damages. 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff on this issue. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. IV 
1. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED INTERROGATORY 2 or 3 "YES", WHAT 
SUM, IF ANY, DO FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED AS PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT AND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF? 
AWARD 
Explanation: The plaintiff here alleges that the defendant 
should be punished for an intentional wrong. The defendant denies 
not only the intentional wrong but also alleges that even if quilty 
of a intentional wrong no punitive damages should be awarded. This 
issue is submitted to the jury. 
If the jury finds a "YES" answer to Interrogatory 2 and/or 3 
it can legally award punitive damages. The fact that it can award 
damages does not mandate that it do so. The jury should award 
punitive damages only for the purpose of punishing the defendant 
and/or detering the company from acting in this matter in the 
future and/or to deter similar action by others so situated. The 
jury may consider all matters logically bearing on this issue, which 
might include, the motive present, the intended affect on the plaintiff, 
the advantage hoped to be gained, and the presence of malice and **& 
its degree. '**• 
If the jury awards punitive damages, in determining the amount 
to be awarded, the jury should act with caution. It may consider 
the sum needed, if any, to deter the defendant for so acting in the 
future or to deter others from so acting in the future or to punish 
this particular defendant. 
The jury may consider the wealth of the defendant in determining 
the effect of an award. The jury may also consider whether or not 
the plaintiff is a proper person to receive such an award. The ce*?*t d 
may consider the plaintiff's innocence or intentional conduct in the 
total matter. 
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The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence: 
1st. That the defendant should be punished in this case, and 
2nd. The amount of punishment that should be inflicted, and 
3rd. That the plaintiff is a proper person to receive such an 
award. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. VANDYKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE 
DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
Defendant 
SPECIAL 
JURY VERDICT 
Civil No. 19389 
ORIGINAL 
INTERROGATORY NO. I 
WHAT SUM DO YOU FIND PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS COMPENSA-
TION DAMAGES FOR THE DEFENDANT'S WRONGFUL ENTRY OF A 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY AND/OR IN FILING OF 
A JUDGMENT IN BOX ELDER COUNTY THAT LIENED THE PLAINTIFF'S 
REAL PROPERTY? 
"} •' 
0h 
AWARDED 
INTERROGATORY NO. II 
DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S BREACH OF CONTRACT IN THE TAKING OF 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND/OR FILING THE JUDGMENT IN BOX 
ELDER COUNTY WAS AN INTENTIONAL BREACH OF CONTRACT DONE 
WITH MALICE OR TO GAIN AN UNLAWFUL ADVANTAGE OVER THE 
PLAINTIFF? 
"YES" %, 
"NO" N LI !Yl bG i'_—-^-*-"-4-"' 
FILED 
-30-
JUL 11 19 
By. 
SPECIAL JURY VERDICT CONTINUED 
INTERROGATORY NO. Ill 
DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEES AND/OR LAWYER INTENTIONALLY 
USED ILLEGALLY "ABUSED THE PROCESS" BY UNLAWFULLY FILING 
OR ALLOWING AN INVALID JUDGMENT TO BE CONTINUED IN BQX^_j-
ELDER COUNTY TO GAIN AN ILLEGAL CREDITORS ADVANTAGE OF^ /A 
DEBTOR? 
"YES" 
"NO" 
€ 
INTERROGATORY NO. IV 
IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED INTERROGATORY 2 or 3 "YES", WHAT 
SUM, IF ANY, DO FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED AS PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT AND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF? 
AWARD7,? 7 600 ' <r 
DATED THIS 11th DAY OF JULY, 19 86 
f,' '? /(');„. 
FOREPERSON 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. VANDYKE, 
) JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 
vs . ) 
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE H 
DISTRIBUTORS, INC., ) Civil No. 19389 
Defendant. 
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for 
trial on the 10th day of July, 1986; and the Plaintiff having been 
present in person and represented by counsel, Michael L. Miller; 
and the Defendant having been present by and through its agent and 
represented by counsel, Dennis K. Poole; and the court, the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist District Judge presiding, having 
empaneled a jury; and the parties having thereafter presented 
evidence to the jury; and the court having determined that as a 
matter of law, certain issues were not in dispute; and the jury 
thereafter having retired to deliberate the issues remaining in 
dispute; and having so deliberated having returned a special 
verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarding Plaintiff $250.00 in 
damages for breech of contract and $37,000.00 in punitive damages 
for intentional and malicious breech of contract and and for abuse 
of process; and the court having ordered that judgment be entered 
tfzxf- y. 
on said special verdict, and that in said judgment, an offset be 
given to Defendant for the sums due and owing Plaintiff on the 
balance of the installment contract and the open account in the 
amounts of $1493.98 and $775.93 respectively; now 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff, RICHARD H. VANDYKE, be and is hereby awarded judgment 
against the Defendant, MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
as follows: 
1. $34,980.09 in compensation and punitive damages; 
2. $357.74 in costs; 
3. Interest on the total judgment at the lawful rate from the 
date hereof until collected and costs of the court hereinafter 
accruing. 
DATED this h 
-y-
day of 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT to Defendant's attorney, 
postage prepaid, at: 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
Attorney at Law 
Prowswood Plaza, Suite 306 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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sel L. Mil ler 
ley at Law 
Main 
Box 399 
3m City, Ut. 
723 1784 
DATED t h i s gJ^J'H day of 1986 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. VAN DYKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE 
DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 19389 
The defendant has made a motion for a new trial and/or 
in the alternative for a reduction in the punitive damage award. 
The Court here denies those motions. 
When the Court considers a motion such as the one before 
it, it must not substitute its own judgment for that of the 
jury. The Court is not particularly bothered by that rule in 
this case, because the Court's own view is that there was good 
reason to grant substantial punitive damages. If the Court gives 
due consideration to the jury's findings, it would find facts as 
indicated below. 
FACTS 
1. The plaintiff is a businessman in Brigham City, Box 
Elder County. He conducts a restaurant business there, and also 
has a business that might be called an arcade, that is where 
people play video games, etc. The defendant is in the business 
>3/7-i\'i inner, 
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Case No. 19389 
of selling the coin machines to arcades. The plaintiff became 
interested in a very complicated machine, wherein the player 
participated in general as though he was the pilot of an 
aircraft. Plaintiff and defendant eventually reached an agree-
ment and entered into a contract wherein plaintiff was to 
purchase the machine and pay a sum of monies on an installment 
basis for it. 
2. The machine was delivered and installed on tj)e 
plaintiff's premises. The machine performed exactly as it 
should. The difficulty was that for some reason the teenagers, 
or customers, were not attracted to the machine in sufficient 
numbers that the continued placement of the machine on plain-
tiff's premises was economically justified. Plaintiff attempted 
to force the defendant to accept the return of the machine. The 
defendant stood on its rights and refused delivery, and informed 
the plaintiff that he would be held to the contract. 
• % 
3. The defendant transferred the contract to a 
subsidiary corporation. This corporation was a finance company. 
In general the finance company took the position that it was a 
bonafide purchase for value, and that they were not subject to 
any defenses the plaintiff might assert in the nature of a right 
to return the machine. This frustrated the plaintiff. The 
general situation suggests that this set up had been engineered 
in part to frustrate persons such as the plaintiff, or persons in 
the plaintiff's position. 
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4. The defendant filed suit against the plaintiff on 
the contract. The parties eventually re-negotiated a settlement 
that occurred between the plaintiff and one of the two corpora-
tions. The payments were in part delinquent at times, but in 
general were made pursuant to the contract. The other corpora-
tion continued the suit and secured a default judgment in Salt 
Lake County, in Murray Circuit Court. This default was entered 
by the defendant without the plaintiff's knowledge, and was a 
complete surprise to the plaintiff, because it occurred after it 
settled. 
5. Plaintiff contacted the defendant corporation and 
requested that they remove the judgment, inasmuch as the cause of 
action under which the judgment was taken had been negotiated and 
settled, and that, therefore, the judgment was invalid. The 
judgment was filed in Box Elder County. 
6. Eventually the defendant caused the plaintiff to be 
informed by an attorney that the judgment would not be removed 
because the plaintiff owed a separate sum of money on an open 
account to the defendant. The plaintiff took the view that this 
was an abuse of process. Plaintiff attempted to have the 
judgment removed. It was terribly upsetting to him as he was 
attempting to refinance his home. The general mortgage rates had 
dropped. He believed he could not do so because of the existence 
of a judgment against him. His evidence of damages in this 
respect failed. The bank indicated that they probably would have 
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rewritten the plaintiff's contract at any time he desired them to 
because of their personal acquaintance and respect for the 
plaintiff, but that the rate of interest would not have dropped, 
because they were charging 1% above prime on all commercial 
transactions, and this would be regarded as such a loan. The 
jury likely determined that the judgment was left on the books 
for a improper purpose, and that it was done deliberately a|td 
knowingly by the attorney who served both corporations and t|^e 
business heads for each company. 
7. The plaintiff employed an attorney who requested the 
judgment be removed. He later charged the plaintiff $250 to 
threaten suit if the judgment was not removed. After the threat 
was made, time passed, and eventually the judgment was removed. 
The plaintiff then filed this suit for abuse of process, to-wit: 
the taking of an invalid judgment in Murray Circuit Court, and 
the docketing of it in Box Elder County for an improper purpose 
and the refusal to remove it for an improper purpose. •» 
8. The jury awarded actual damages in the amount of 
$250. This is exactly the sum claimed as attorney's fees paid by 
the plaintiff to his lawyer to threaten suit and get the judgment 
removed. 
9. Some evidence as to the wealth of the defendant was 
received. The usual instructions on punitive damages were given. 
10. The jury then awarded $37,000 as and for punitive 
damages as punishment against the parent company. 
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ISSUE 
There are many Utah decisions in which there are 
discussions that there should exist some relationship between 
actual damages suffered and punitive damages awarded. Some of 
these judgments would suggest that punitive damages are excessive 
when they exceed three or four times the actual damages 
suffered. Most of the cases that take this approach are cases in 
which there are no actual evidence as to the defendant's net 
worth or as to its wealth. There is in this case an exhibit 
which shows that the defendants were prepared to acknowledge 
during discovery that the net worth of the parent corporation was 
at least one and one-half million dollars. The plaintiff's 
attorney argued the case to the jury; that the abuse of process 
was obvious and clear; and done by corporation counsel of the two 
corporations; and also with full knowledge of the heads of the 
defendant corporation. There is circumstantial evidence to 
support this argument. Plaintiff's counsel further argued to the 
jury that to award a few hundred or a few thousand dollars in 
this case as punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. The 
company could absorb such losses painlessly and continue to do 
this type of a practice to enforce collection of debt. The 
attorney further argued that if the debtor's rights are to be 
enforced at all in a case like this, there would have to be an 
award of sufficient punitive damages that a debtor could afford 
-39-
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to bring the lawsuit against them and also such a sum of money 
that it would remove the profits which a corporation, or a 
corporation with subsidiaries, might enjoy through misuse of this 
collection device. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah authorities, and the federal authorities, have 
been faced with this type of an issue before. These authorities 
consider the wealth of the defendant, its motive, and the amount 
of judgment which would be necessary to remove any probable 
profit from continuing the practice by defendant and others so 
situated. It is the plaintiff's position that a judgment in the 
amount here awarded is appropriate for those purposes. 
This particular litigation resembles other litigations 
the Court has witnessed. At times creditors are in a position to 
take unjustified advantages over their debtors. There are 
penalties built into the Commercial Code intending to stop this 
type of practice. This particular action is not brought under 
the Commercial Code. It is brought appropriately under the tort 
law for abuse of process. The amount of punitive damages, which 
should and can be awarded, is not capable of an exact 
measurement. In general, it would have to be a sufficient sum 
that a defendant of this size, that does its business through 
corporations, has attorneys on retainer, etc., would find it 
unprofitable to do this type of thing to debtors in the future. 
-40-
-i o -
I r-> 
Page 7 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 19389 
The Court has considered what sum would be proper. It 
has considered sums of $10,000, $25,000, and the $37,000 award. 
The Court recognizes that this was deliberate misconduct done 
under the advise of an attorney. The Court recognizes that the 
defendant does a large retail business in its own name and an 
undisclosed amount of business through subsidiary corporations. 
The Court finds that it cannot, in its discretion, say that this 
sum is excessive. The Court saw no evidence of anger or 
animosity among the jurors. The Court notes that jurors did 
include persons of business experience and sophistication. The 
Court finds that it must respect the jurors1 judgment. 
DATED this £p\ ^day of September, 1986. 
OHN F. WAHLQUIST, Judge 
v J ( 
1/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was served upon the following: 
Michael L. Miller 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Dennis K. Poole 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 /"\ 
^ V ^ , 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant were served upon the Plaintiff 
and Respondent, Richard H. VanDyke, by mailing the same, 
postage prepaid, to Michael L. Miller, Esq., Attorney for 
Respondent, 29 South Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302, 
this 13th day of January, 1987. 
OTTA^AJ^/?. ThAJtAAAjtuA) 
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